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I. INTRODUCTION
The functionality doctrine serves a unique role in trademark
law: unlike virtually every other doctrine, functionality can
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discussions of the ideas in this Article, and to Mark Lemley and the participants at the
University of Houston Law Center's Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law
Summer Symposium in Santa Fe for their helpful feedback on an earlier draft. Thanks,
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trump consumer confusion (or so it seems, at least in mechanical
functionality cases). In this sense, functionality may be the only
doctrine in trademark law that can truly be considered a defense.
But despite its potential power, the functionality doctrine is quite
inconsistently applied. This is true of mechanical functionality
cases because courts differ over the extent to which the doctrine
focuses on competitors' right to copy unpatented features as
opposed to their need to copy.' And aesthetic functionality cases
are even more scattered: some courts refuse to recognize the
aesthetic functionality doctrine at all, and courts that do
recognize it are often reluctant to actually find the features at
issue functional, even when exclusive use of those features seems
very likely to put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-
related disadvantage.2
The problem is not simply that courts do not understand or do
not like the functionality doctrine, though there is reason to believe
both of those conclusions are warranted. It is instead that courts
have fundamentally different views about the purposes of
functionality. These differing views reflect a longstanding lack of
consensus about trademark law's proper role in competition policy
and equally longstanding, if unexamined, intuitions about the types
of features that are competitively important. Put simply, trademark
law lacks a sufficiently robust theory of legitimate competition
against which particular actions can be judged "unfair." This Article
uses functionality as a means of highlighting courts' lack of
consensus about the relationship between trademark law and
competition.
II. MECHANICAL FUNCTIONALITY AND THE
COMPEITIVE LANDSCAPE
Broadly speaking, courts have conceived of functionality in
two different ways, at least in the context of utilitarian features:
(1) as a mechanism for insuring access to competitively necessary
product features; and (2) as a means of channeling protection of
certain features exclusively to patent law. Functionality doctrine,
however, has remained divided because courts have never been
able to agree on the relative importance of the policy goals these
1. Compare In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A.
1982) ("[I1t is clear that courts in the past have considered the public policy involved in
this area of law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles ... but the need to copy those
articles... ."), with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) ("An
unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public
domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.").
2. See infra Part .B.
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views reflect. The following sections delineate two distinct
doctrinal approaches to functionality and link each of those
approaches to historical antecedents. As these sections reveal,
the fractured state of modern doctrine reflects deep and
persistent disagreement about the level at which trademark
law's relationship to competition should be worked out.
A. Pre-TrafFix Decisions and the Need to Copy
Prior to the Court's decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc.,' many courts viewed the functionality
doctrine primarily as a means of preserving access to competitively
necessary features. In In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., for
example, the Federal Circuit's predecessor famously explained that
functionality refers to the utility of an object's design, which "is
determined in light of 'utility,' which is determined in light of
'superiority of design,' and rests upon the foundation 'essential to
effective competition."' Because, in that court's view, "the effect
upon competition 'is really the crux of the matter"'" in functionality
cases, the issue is "not the right to slavishly copy articles [that] are
not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those
articles, which is more properly termed the right to compete
effectively." It is relevant to a determination of functionality under
this approach that the utilitarian advantages of the claimed
features were disclosed in an expired utility patent, but that fact is
not dispositive.' Other relevant factors include: (1) whether the
originator of the design touts the design's utilitarian advantages
through advertising; (2) whether alternative designs are available;
and (3) whether the design results from a comparatively simple or
cheap method of manufacturing the article.'
This approach to functionality proved influential, both
conceptually and doctrinally: many courts both accepted that
3. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
4. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1340 (quoting Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,
601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979)).
5. Id. at 1341 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id. at 1339.
7. Id. at 1340-41 (discussing the relevance of expired utility patents as evidence of the
design's functionality); see also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("'To be sure, statements in a patent may provide evidence that the
asserted trade dress is functional, and thus not entitled to legal protection. But the fact that a
patent has been acquired does not convert what otherwise would have been protected trade
dress into nonprotected matter." (citations omitted)); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.,
138 F.3d 277, 288 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e find that there is no per se prohibition against features
disclosed in a patent receiving trademark protection after the patent has expired.").
8. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341.
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competitive need is really the "crux" of the matter and adopted the
Morton-Norwich factors as the doctrinal framework for
determining the functionality of particular features. Indeed, by
the time the Supreme Court resolved the "circuit split" regarding
the evidentiary value of an expired utility patent in TrafFix,o at
least three circuits had expressly signed on to Morton-Norwich,'
and only one circuit had taken a different approach. 2
9. See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pac. Bay Int'l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 685 (6th Cir. 2006)
(affirming the district court's application of the Morton-Norwich factors); Specialized
Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(describing the court's adoption of the Morton-Norwich test); Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. Kerr
Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 482, 486-87 (D. Del. 1990) (explaining that, while it had not
explicitly adopted the Morton-Norwich test, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had used
the same framework to analyze functionality).
10. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30.
11. In addition to the Sixth Circuit, whose decision was on appeal to the Supreme Court
in TrafFix, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits took approaches very similar to Morton-Norwich.
See Thomas & Betts Corp., 138 F.3d at 297 ("In this Circuit, a 'feature is functional if it is
one that is costly to design around or to do without, rather than one that is costly to have.'
The fact that the feature at issue serves some function is not enough; to be functional in
the trade dress sense, the feature must be 'necessary to afford a competitor the means to
compete effectively.'" (citations omitted)); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d
246, 255 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The ultimate inquiry concerning functionality .. . is whether
characterizing a feature or configuration as protected will hinder competition or impinge upon
the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of goods." (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow &
Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sno-Wizard
Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
Morton-Norwich provides the appropriate test of functionality). The Federal Circuit
largely stayed true to Morton-Norwich in the years preceding Tra/Fix. See, e.g., Midwest
Indus., 175 F.3d at 1361-62 (noting that the Federal Circuit and its predecessor had
"repeatedly held that the availability of trade dress protection does not depend on whether
a patent has been obtained for the product or feature in question" and defining functionality,
the sole mechanism for preventing trade dress from having "anti-competitive effects," in
terms of whether a feature "possesse[s] such utility that its protection would hinder
competition"); New England Butt Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (relying on the Morton-Norwich factors, which "emphasize[] that functionality is to
be determined in light of the competitive necessity to copy"); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d
866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("If the feature asserted to give a product distinctiveness is the
best, or at least one, of a few superior designs for its de facto purpose, it follows that
competition is hindered. Morton-Norwich does not rest on total elimination of competition
in the goods."); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[The reason
the de jure functional rejection exists is, as stated in Morton-Norwich, because '[T]he public
policy involved in this area of the law [is], not the right to slavishly copy articles which
are not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more
properly termed the right to compete effectively.'" (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339)). But the Federal Circuit did occasionally
acknowledge that the functionality doctrine served a channeling function as well. See
Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The
reason for the functionality limitation, as explained in the seminal Morton -]Norwich
case, is to protect the fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor's
superior product, which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright
laws.").
12. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("We hold that where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a
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B. TrafFix and the Right to Copy
TrafFix was a response to the Morton-Norwich "need to
copy" view of functionality. On the specific question presented,
TrafFix held that an expired utility patent "has vital significance
in resolving the trade dress claim" because a "utility patent is
strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional."" Where the claimed features are unregistered, this
"strong evidence of functionality ... adds great weight to the
statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until
proved otherwise."'
Important as that holding was, it really just reflected the
Supreme Court's view of the policies animating the functionality
doctrine, which the Court believed the Sixth Circuit-and, by
extension, all of the courts following the Morton-Norwich
approach-misunderstood.'" Functionality, according to the
Supreme Court, is not simply about competitive need for product
features; it is also, even primarily, intended to police the
boundary between trademark and patent law by channeling
utility patent . .. patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the
configuration is nonfunctional."). Vornado marked a different approach even for the Tenth
Circuit, which had previously defined functionality in terms of competitive need. See
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
with approval the district court's statement that "'[s]ince the effect upon competition is
really the crux of the matter, it is of course significant that there are other alternatives
available'" (alteration in original) (quoting Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brunswick
Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[We adopt a test [of
functionality] whose focus is the effect on competition."). The Vornado opinion suggests
that the court felt the need to alter its approach because of the Supreme Court's
intervening decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989). See Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1503 ("Subsequent to Hartford and Brunswick, the
Supreme Court ruled in Bonito Boats, clarifying that patent law creates a federal right to
copy and use product features that are in the public domain, whether under an expired
patent or for lack of patentability in the first place." (citation omitted)). But that cannot
completely explain the Tenth Circuit's change of course because, as the court admitted,
the Supreme Court had also just decided Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S.
159 (1995), and Qualitex defined functionality in terms of competitive need even while
offering explanations of the functionality doctrine that sounded in both effect on
competition and channeling terms. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1507; see also Qualitex, 514 U.S.
at 165 ('[I]n general terms, a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve as a
trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article,' that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))).
13. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29.
14. Id. at 29-30.
15. See id. at 32 ("In finding for MDI on the trade dress issue the Court of Appeals
gave insufficient recognition to the importance of the expired utility patents, and their
evidentiary significance, in establishing the functionality of the device. The error likely
was caused by its misinterpretation of trade dress principles in other respects.").
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protection of useful product features exclusively to the patent
system."
Patent law strikes a careful bargain: it offers very strong
protection, even against those who have invented
independently, 7 but that protection is available only for new,
useful, and nonobvious inventions that are adequately disclosed
in the patent application.'8 Patent protection is also relatively
short in duration-for most inventions, lasting only twenty years
from the date of application." The functionality doctrine,
according to TrafFix, aims to protect the integrity of that bargain
by preventing parties from using trademark law to evade patent
law's limitations and to acquire exclusive rights of potentially
unlimited duration in unpatented or formerly patented features.20
Given this view of functionality, the Court's focus on the content
of an expired patent's claims was not surprising, since the
conflict with patent law is most acute when the features at issue
have already benefitted from patent protection: "Where the
expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to
establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of
showing that the feature is not functional, for instance, by showing
that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of
the device."2'
The TrafFix approach, and specifically its emphasis on
expired utility patents, is importantly different from an approach
focused on competitive need because many features will be
deemed functional under TrafFix even though the particular
defendant before the court does not need access to those features
to compete effectively.22 As the modern consensus that patents
16. See id. at 29 (explaining the benefits of trade dress protection in relation to the
influenpes of a competitive economy).
17. In fact, the vast majority of patent defendants seem to be independent inventors
because few cases involve evidence of copying. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A.
Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009) (finding references to
allegations of copying in only 129 of 1,871 (6.89%) published patent decisions included
within the authors' study).
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
20. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 34-35 (cautioning against misuse or overextension of
trade dress protection, in light of patent law's limitations); cf Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation
and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 128 n.113 (2008) (describing the
Court's holding in TrafFix as denying trade dress protection when it was clear from the
existence of a prior utility patent that the device for which the patentee was claiming
protection had "a utility function, whose patent had expired; in sum rejecting an attempt to
lengthen the term of a patent by turning it into a trade dress claim").
21. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
22. Cf Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1959) ("In
approaching the question of whether Schreiber & Goldberg's copying of the Amco machine
828 [ 48:4
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21cannot be presumed to confer market power attests, many
patented features are not competitively necessary-alternative
designs are frequently available. Indeed, the facts of TrafFix are
illustrative here. The Sixth Circuit had held that the dual-spring
design was not competitively necessary because it took "little
imagination to conceive of a hidden dual-spring mechanism or a
tril- or quad-spring mechanism," and those noninfringing
alternatives would not have been significantly more expensive to
produce.24 Hence, while exclusive use of the dual-spring design
might have hindered competition somewhat, the disadvantage
was not significant, and the design was therefore not functional."
The Sixth Circuit was wrong, according to the Supreme
Court, because it "seemed to interpret [language from Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.2 6 and Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co. 27] to mean that a necessary test for
functionality is 'whether the particular product configuration is a
competitive necessity,"' and that was "incorrect as a
comprehensive definition."2 8 Restating the "traditional" test of
functionality from Inwood, the Court noted that a feature is "also
functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device
or when it affects the cost or quality of the device."" And
is actionable, it must be remembered that the interests and equities of the litigants at bar
are not the only ones which must be considered. Indeed, the underlying principles of our
competitive economy and the desirability of passing on to the American public the
advances of technical progress not only are entitled to consideration, in fact they
dominate the picture ... . [Ilmitation is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded
availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply
and demand to yield the fair price society must pay for a given commodity.").
23. See Il. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006)
(eliminating the presumption of market power that had been attributed to the tying
product in an antitrust case where the tying product was patented). Illinois Tool Works
reflected the clear weight of scholarly opinion. See id. at 44 ("[T~he vast majority of
academic literature recognizes that a patent does not necessarily confer market power.").
24. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 27; see also Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc.,
971 F. Supp. 262, 281 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (discussing the court's finding that some
competitors' signs are less expensive).
25. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 27-28. According to the Sixth Circuit, it was not enough
that "allowing exclusive use of a particular feature such as the dual-spring design in the
guise of trade dress would 'hinde[r] competition somewhat'" if the disadvantage was not
significant. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices,
Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 1999)).
26. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) ("In general
terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.").
27. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood
and referring to a functional feature as one the "exclusive use of [which] would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage").
28. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Traffix, 200 F.3d at 940).
29. Id. at 33.
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significantly, when a feature is functional under this "traditional"
definition, "there is no need to proceed further to consider if there
is a competitive necessity for the feature."o For the Supreme
Court, the fact that "the dual-spring design provide[d] a unique
and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind" established
its functionality because the design was essential to the use or
purpose of the article and/or affected its quality."' Thus, "[tihere
[was] no need ... to engage, as did the [Sixth Circuit], in
speculation about other design possibilities."32 Functionality was
established under the traditional test without reference to
competitive need, and having been established, competitors were
not required to explore alternative designs even though
alternative designs were readily available. This view of
functionality is grounded in a belief that only patent law can
abrogate the right to copy features within the scope of
patentable subject matter, and it stands in opposition to the
Morton-Norwich view that the effect on competition is "the
crux of the matter."
The Court's de-emphasis of competitive need in TrafFix was
also practically important. To the extent fumctionality is determined
by competitive need, courts will have to engage in some form of
market definition since the question of whether exclusive use of a
feature would put competitors at a non-reputation-related
disadvantage depends entirely on the nature of the market in which
the parties compete. This is a problem because courts have never
been able to develop a methodology for defining relevant markets in
functionality cases-or in any intellectual property context, for that
matter." Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, Inc. is
representative here.3 4 In that case, plaintiff Dippin' Dots argued
that the color, shape, and size of its flash-frozen ice cream beads
were nonfunctional because Frosty Bites "could still compete in
the ice cream market by producing, e.g., soft-serve ice cream,
which would not have many of the same functional elements as
dippin' dots [sic] and thus would not infringe upon DDI's product
30. Id. ("[By contrast], [ilt is proper to inquire into a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage in cases of [a]esthetic functionality, the question involved in Qualitex."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. Id. at 33-34.
32. Id. at 33.
33. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (describing
courts' lack of methodology for defining markets in a variety of IP contexts).
34. See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 n.7




trade dress."" The court found that argument "unavailing"
because, as it noted, Frosty Bites "[did] not want to compete in
the ice cream business; it want[ed] to compete in the flash-frozen
ice cream business, which is [ I a different market from more
traditional forms of ice cream."3 6 Having determined that the
market for flash-frozen ice cream was the relevant market, it
seemed obvious to the court that exclusive use of the particular
colors, shape, and size of Dippin Dots' ice cream beads would put
Frosty Bites at a significant competitive disadvantage." One simply
cannot make flash-frozen ice cream that looks significantly
different from Dippin' Dots. But that only begs the question: how
35. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff argued those features were not aesthetically
functional. Id. As I discuss below, courts universally have accepted that competitive need
is the only relevant consideration in aesthetic functionality cases, so this concern about
market definition is particularly pronounced in those cases. See infra Part III.A.
36. See Dippin' Dots, 369 F.3d at 1203 n.7 (citing 3 LOUIs ALTMAN & MALLA
POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 19:7, at
19-79 (4th ed. 2003) ("[Flunctionality . .. is not to be determined within the broad
compass of different but interchangeable products; the doctrine of functionality is
intended to preserve competition within the narrow bounds of each individual product
market.")).
37. Justice Breyer had a similar intuition about relevant markets in the oral argument
for American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Am.
Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/08-661.pdf. The issue
in that case was whether the National Football League should be regarded as a single
entity for purposes of licensing merchandise or whether each of the thirty-two individual
teams act independently in that capacity. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208; Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra, at 12. During the oral argument, Justice Breyer inquired about
the possibility of competition between merchandise of different teams (as opposed to
competition between different providers of merchandise of the same team), leading to the
following exchange:
JUSTICE BREYER: You want the Red Sox to compete in selling T-shirts with
the Yankees; is that right?
MR. NAGER: The ability to compete. Yes.
JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. Okay. I don't know a Red Sox fan who would take a
Yankees sweatshirt if you gave it away.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, I don't know where you're going to get your expert
from that is going to say there is competition -
MR. NAGER: Well -
JUSTICE [BREYER]: - between those two products. I think they would rather
- they would rather wear a baseball, a football, a hockey shirt.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 17. Justice Breyer's intuition was that the markets
for Red Sox and Yankees merchandise are discrete, such that exclusive control over Red
Sox merchandise gives one meaningful control over a relevant market: Red Sox fans do
not want Yankees caps, and no discounting of the price will be sufficient to get them to
switch. This is an intuition I tend to share, though if the intuition were correct, logos
would have to be considered functional in trademark cases, a result that has not been
forthcoming. The point here is that courts have resisted that conclusion, not because they
have taken evidence on the proper market definition, but because they do not like the
results that would follow.
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do we know that the market for flash-frozen ice cream is a
discrete one, distinct from the market for other types of ice
cream? The court's conclusion on this score may well have been
correct, but the court arrived at that conclusion entirely by
intuition. The opinion offers no methodology for defining relevant
markets generally. This kind of gap is a serious problem for a
doctrine that purports to determine protectability by reference to
competitive need.
1. Essentiality and Alternative Designs. Despite the
Supreme Court's rejection of the Morton-Norwich conception of
functionality, the language of functionality the Court developed
in Inwood and embraced again in TrafFix has proven
insufficiently constraining for courts that continue to insist that
functionality is essentially about the effect on competition.
Courts convinced of that understanding have seized on ambiguity
about what it means for a feature to be "essential to the use or
purpose of the article."" In Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord
Corp., for example, the Federal Circuit reiterated its view that
the effect on competition is "the crux" of functionality and
claimed that the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix did not
change the law of functionality or alter the Morton-Norwich
analysis." Specifically, the Federal Circuit claimed that
alternative design possibilities remain relevant to functionality
because courts can only determine whether a feature is "essential to
the use or purpose of the article"'o by considering the availability of
alternatives. In the Federal Circuit's view, essentiality is a relative
issue: features are essential when there are no good alternatives.
2. Essentiality vs. Arbitrary Flourish. In Eppendorf-Netheler-
Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that TrafFix required it to abandon its prior
"utilitarian test" of functionality, under which "[t]he ultimate
inquiry concerning functionality .. . [was] whether characterizing
a feature or configuration as protected '[would] hinder
competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete
effectively in the sale of goods."" After TrafFix, the Fifth Circuit
38. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
39. Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("We do
not understand the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich
analysis."); see also id. ("We find it significant that neither party argues that TrafFix
changed the law of functionality. . .
40. Id. at 1275.
41. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz G1IBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir.
2002) (first alteration in original) (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d
832 [48:4
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noted, competitive need was no longer central to functionality.4 2
As a result, and in specific contrast to Valu Engineering, the
Fifth Circuit evaluated the functionality of Eppendorfs design in
abstract feature space, without reference to alternative designs.
It was undisputed, the court noted, that the features for which
Eppendorf sought protection" each played a role in the function
of its products." Those features, then, were not arbitrary
flourishes, and it did not matter that Eppendorf could have
changed their appearance (for example, by altering the number
of fins) without affecting their function.45 For the Fifth Circuit,
"essential to the use or purpose" is simply the opposite of "arbitrary
flourish": features are "essential to the use or purpose" of an
article when they play some role in the article's function and are
not arbitrary or incidental flourishes.46 Essentiality is not
relative, so alternative designs are irrelevant."
3. Right to Copy vs. Need to Copy, Still. Valu Engineering
and Eppendorf weighed alternative designs differently because
the courts that decided those cases had fundamentally different
417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the court, the
"utilitarian test" is still valid as a secondary test, but it "is not a comprehensive definition
of functionality." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 357-58. Eppendorf contended that Ritter infringed upon eight elements of
Eppendorfs disposable pipette tips:
(1) the flange on top of the tip; (2) the fins connecting the flange to the body of
the tip; (3) the plunger head; (4) the plunger; (5) the length of the tips; (6) the
eight sizes of the tips; (7) the coloring scheme on the tips; and (8) the angle of the
stump on the tips.
Id. at 354.
44. Id. at 358. The court reasoned:
It is undisputed that: (1) The flange is necessary to connect the Combitip to the
dispenser syringe; (2) The rings on the plunger head are necessary to lock the
plunger into a cylinder in the dispenser syringe; (3) The plunger is necessary to push
liquids out of the tip, and the ribs on the plunger stabilize its action; (4) The tips at
the lower end of the Combitips are designed to easily fit into test tubes and other
receptacles; (5) The size of the Combitip determines the dispensed volume, and size is
essential to accurate and efficient dispensing-, (6) The color scheme used on the
Combitip-clear plastic with black lettering-enables the user easily to see and
measure the amount of liquid in the Combitip, and black is standard in the medical
industry; and (7) The stumps of the larger Combitips must be angled to separate air
bubbles from the liquid and ensure that the full volume of liquid is dispensed.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 355, 357.
47. Id. at 358 ("Although alternative designs are relevant to the utilitarian test of
functionality, alternative designs are not germane to the traditional test for functionality.
Each of the eight design elements identified by Eppendorf is essential to the use or
purpose of the Combitips, and [are] not arbitrary or ornamental features.").
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understandings of the policies underlying functionality, and
particularly of the extent to which TrafFix resolved the question.
The Federal Circuit continues to focus on alternative designs as
evidence of competitive need because it does not believe there is
anything inherently problematic about trademark rights
attaching to features that might be the subject of patent
protection. For the Federal Circuit, features that signify source
should be protected by trademark law unless exclusive use of
those features would impose particular harm on competitors. The
prospect of trademark rights attaching to features that once were
the subject of a utility patent, or that are patentable subject
matter but ineligible for patent protection, is of no particular
concern.
The Fifth Circuit reads TrafFix as an attempt to
deemphasize competitive need in favor of a default principle
under which features that play a role in the article's utilitarian
performance are ineligible for trademark protection. On this
view, functionality is a structural issue: features that are within
the subject matter of patent law are, for that reason alone,
illegitimate subjects of trademark law. These features fall outside
of trademark law's reach not because of the consequences of
trademark protection for particular competitors, but to preserve
the broader structure of the intellectual property system.
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit's view treats freedom to copy as the
background legal rule to which patent law operates as a carefully
circumscribed exception.48
In my view, the Fifth Circuit's view of functionality as a
channeling doctrine is much more faithful to the Supreme
Court's decision in TrafFix, both doctrinally and conceptually.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the features of Eppendorfs
pipette tips mirrors the Court's evaluation of MDI's dual-spring
design in TrafFix. The Court found MDI's dual-spring design
functional despite evidence that alternative designs were
available and only marginally more expensive.49 The dual-spring
48. See id. at 355 ("Trade dress protection, however, is not intended to create
patent-like rights in innovative aspects of product design. Trade dress protection, unlike
patent law, does not foster innovation by preventing reverse engineering or copying of
innovative product design features."); see also id. ("Trade dress protection must subsist
with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods
and products." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pebble Beach Co. v.
Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 548 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he functionality doctrine prevents
trademark law from inhibiting legitimate competition by protecting useful product
features, which is the province of patent law."), abrogated on other grounds by TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
49. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 26-28, 32.
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design was essential to the use or purpose of MDI's sign stands,
and that design was therefore functional irrespective of
alternative design possibilities.5 o The Court never specified what
it meant for a feature to be "essential to the use or purpose" of a
device, but it gave a significant clue when it dismissed the need
to consider alternative designs: "[Tihe functionality of the spring
design means that competitors need not explore whether other
spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design is
not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI's product; it
is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be
attempted."" The Court struck a similar chord when it explained
the circumstances under which features disclosed in a patent
might nevertheless not be considered functional:
In a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary,
incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a product
found in the patent claims, such as arbitrary curves in the
legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the springs, a
different result might obtain. There the manufacturer could
perhaps prove that those aspects do not serve a purpose
within the terms of the utility patent.52
Product features, under this view, are functional when they
are essential to the use or purpose of an article. Whether a
feature is essential can be determined without reference to
alternative designs because essentiality entails only that the
feature plays a role in making the plaintiffs product work.
Because features that are "ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary"
do not play a role in making the product work, those features are
not "essential" to the use or purpose of an article. Expired utility
patents are particularly probative evidence because features that
were disclosed in a utility patent-and particularly those that
were claimed-generally are not merely "ornamental, incidental,
or arbitrary.""
50. Id. at 30 ("[Tlhe dual-spring design is the essential feature of the trade dress
MDI now seeks to establish and to protect.").
51. Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 34. This conclusion did not depend simply on the fact that the dual-spring
design was formerly the subject of a utility patent, as the Court went on to say that
"[wihether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product
design which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is 'essential to the
use or purpose of the article' or 'affects the cost or quality of the article."' Id. at 35 (quoting
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
53. Expired utility patents are not dispositive, however, precisely because features
disclosed in patents can be "arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental," even if only rarely. See
id. at 34 (declaring that a court may aid its finding by "going beyond the claims"




This understanding of functionality works from a premise
that patent law operates as a carefully circumscribed exception
to a general rule of free copying. On this view, the functionality
doctrine is not primarily concerned with the competitive position
of the parties in a particular case; it does not matter, for
example, whether exclusive use of a feature (or set of features)
would put a particular defendant at a competitive disadvantage.4
This is not to say that functionality is unconcerned with
promoting competition; it is instead to say that, in the Supreme
Court's view, patent law's limits embed policy choices about
competition values at a structural level, and trademark law should
reinforce those policy choices by refusing trademark protection to
useful product features. Put differently, patent law operates on a
background rule of free copying, and exceptions to that rule must be
had through the patent system, at least for features that might be
the subject of patent law. Hence, the fact that a feature was
formerly the subject of patent law is of "vital significance."
C. The Intractable Baseline Problem
Courts' persistent disagreement about the level at which
competition values should be incorporated-specifically, about
whether to defer to the structural determinations made by the
patent laws or to make judgments about the effects on
competition on a case-by-case basis-should be no real surprise
because that disagreement has very long roots. In fact, both the
"right to copy" and "need to copy" views have old antecedents.
On the "right to copy" side are cases like Flagg
Manufacturing Co. v. Holway, in which the plaintiff sought to
restrain the defendant from selling zithers whose design imitated
its own." Despite finding that the defendant had "deliberately
copied the plaintiffs instrument in all essential and many
non[-]essential details," the court rejected the plaintiffs claim,
implicitly rejecting the notion that trademark law would ever
protect the shape or design of a product." Because the
plaintiffs zithers were not patented, the court noted:
[Tihe defendant ha[d] the same right that the plaintiff ha[d]
to manufacture instruments in the present form, to imitate
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 29-30; cf Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter, 289 F.3d 351, 356 &
n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) ("A product feature that satisfies the traditional definition of
functionality is not shielded from functional status merely because the feature is not a
competitive necessity.").
56. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901).
57. Id.
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the arrangement of the plaintiffs strings or the shape of the
body. In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufacture
cannot be cut down under the name of preventing unfair
competition. All that can be asked is that precautions shall
be taken, so far as are consistent with the defendant's
fundamental right to make and sell what it chooses, to
prevent the deception which no doubt it desires to
practice.58
Competitors, in other words, have a right to share in the
benefit of consumer desire for objects in a particular form, even if
the plaintiff created the desire for that form." A court therefore
cannot restrain even exact copying of unpatented articles; it can
only require some form of labeling as a means of making clear
the actual source of a particular article.
Similarly, the court in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop
Co. expressly allowed the defendant to "copy the plaintiffs
[adjustable wrench] slavishly down to the minutest detail" on the
ground that no one was entitled to "monopolize any [unpatented]
design or pattern, however trifling."o To prevent the defendant
from "represent[ing] himself as the plaintiff' in the sale of the
defendant's wrenches, however, the court suggested that labeling
would be appropriate." Crescent Tool Co. echoes Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.62 and Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co.," both of which refused protection for the
design of formerly patented articles (or, in Kellogg, the product of
a formerly patented process), even though the shape or design of
those articles had become associated with a single source."
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. ("The only thing [the defendant] has not the right to steal is the good will
attaching to the plaintiffs personality, the benefit of the public's desire to have goods
made by the plaintiff.").
60. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1917).
61. See id. ("The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiffs goods
slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in
their sale."). At times, Judge Hand also seemed to suggest even the limited remedy of
labeling would only be required with respect to nonfunctional features by which the
article's source is distinguished, and where "the public is moved in any degree to buy the
[plaintiffs] article because of its source." Id. at 300.
62. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
63. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
64. See id. at 117-18 (refusing to find that the words "Shredded Wheat" had
acquired secondary meaning when consumers associated the words with a particular
product as opposed to a particular producer); Singer, 163 U.S. at 183, 185 (1896) (allowing
the defendant to produce sewing machines with similar designs as the plaintiff, even
though consumers had come to associate the design with the plaintiffs company, because
the protecting patent had expired); Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300-01 ("The defendant,
on the other hand, may copy the plaintiffs goods slavishly down to the minutest detail;
but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.").
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Singer and Kellogg emphasized the right of the public to copy
unpatented articles rather than competitive need," and both
emphasized that labeling, as opposed to limitations on the use of
the design features themselves (or even limitations on the use of
the names "Singer" or "Shredded Wheat"), was the only
legitimate remedy for any confusion that might result from the
defendant's use of the design at issue."
On the other end of the spectrum are cases like George G.
Fox Co. v. Hathaway." In that case, the court enjoined the
defendants' manufacturing and sales of bread loaves that
mirrored the plaintiffs in size, shape, color, and general visual
appearance." It did so despite the fact that the defendant sold its
loaves under a different name and packaged its loaves in a broad
paper band that was marked "Hathaway's Log Cabin Bread.
Finest Flavor, Malted."69 The court was somewhat unimpressed
by the defendant's labeling efforts, but it also made clear that the
labeling would not have been sufficient in any event, as "[t]here
was nothing to show that the defendants' business interests
required the combination of this shape with the same size, color
and general visual appearance" as the plaintiffs loaves."o Indeed,
the court noted, there were "numberless shapes and sizes in
which loaves of bread may be produced, and various peculiarities
of appearance in color and condition of surface."n The defendants,
65. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-20 ("[U]pon expiration of the patents the
form . . . was dedicated to the public."); Singer, 163 U.S. at 185 ("It follows, as a
matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public the
right to make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the
patent.").
66. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120-21 (noting that there was no evidence the
defendant had attempted to pass off its product, as "[tihe Kellogg cartons [were]
distinctive. They d[id] not resemble those used by the plaintiff either in size, form, or
color. And the difference in the labels [was] striking. The Kellogg cartons [bore] in bold
script the names 'Kellogg's Whole Wheat Biscuit' or 'Kellogg's Shredded Whole Wheat
Biscuit' so sized and spaced as to strike the eye as being a Kellogg product" and also
noting that, despite Kellogg's use of a "picture of two shredded wheat biscuits in a bowl of
milk which was quite similar to one of the plaintiffs registered trademarks,... the name
Kellogg was so prominent on all of the defendant's cartons as to minimize the possibility
of confusion"); Singer, 163 U.S. at 204 (enjoining the defendant "from using the word
'Singer' or any equivalent thereto ... without clearly and unmistakably stating in all
said advertisements that the machines are made by the defendant, as distinguished
from the sewing machines made by the Singer Manufacturing Company" (emphasis
omitted)).
67. George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 85 N.E. 417 (Mass. 1908).
68. Id. at 417-18.
69. Id. The plaintiffs loaves used a small paper label containing the words "Fox's




in other words, had no competitive need to make their loaves so
resemble the plaintiffs.72
Those old cases have analogues in more recent Supreme
Court preemption cases, even if the preemption cases have a
different flavor because they involve a conflict between federal
and state law that is absent from the older cases. In Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel & Co., for example, the Court held that
Stiffel could not protect the design of its unpatented pole lamp
under state unfair competition law. It did so using strong "right
to copy" language: "An unpatentable article, like an article on
which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be
made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."" And sounding very
much like the court in Flagg, the Supreme Court suggested that,
while labeling might be appropriate as a mechanism for
mitigating confusion in a case involving product configuration,
courts could not enjoin copying of the product design itself:
Sears has been held liable here for unfair competition
because of a finding of likelihood of confusion based only on
the fact that Sears' lamp was copied from Stiffel's unpatented
lamp and that consequently the two looked exactly alike. Of
course there could be "confusion" as to who had manufactured
these nearly identical articles. But mere inability of the public
to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to support an
injunction against copying or an award of damages for copying
that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied.
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require
that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or
that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers
from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect
businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive
dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to
the source of the goods. But because of the federal patent laws
a State may not, when the article is unpatented and
uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or
award damages for such copying.74
The Court sounded the same freedom to copy note in Sears's
companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.:
72. The court tried to distinguish Flagg by claiming that, in Flagg, the form of the
zither was valuable independent of the goodwill of the particular manufacturer, and the
defendant in that case therefore needed to make his zither in the same form as the
plaintiff. Id. But this distinction misses the main thrust of Flagg, which focused
significantly on the fact the plaintiffs zither was unpatented. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway,
59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901).
73. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
74. Id. at 231-33 (emphasis added).
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Here Day-Brite's fixture has been held not to be entitled to
a design or mechanical patent. Under the federal patent
laws it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied
in every detail by whoever pleases. It is true that the trial
court found that the configuration of Day-Brite's fixture
identified Day-Brite to the trade because the arrangement
of the ribbing had, like a trademark, acquired a "secondary
meaning" by which that particular design was associated
with Day-Brite. But if the design is not entitled to a design
patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be
copied at will. 5
And Compco reiterated that labeling was the only legitimate
remedy in these cases, even when the claimed features are
nonfunctional and have secondary meaning:
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those
who, knowing that the public is relying upon an original
manufacturer's reputation for quality and integrity, deceive
the public by palming off their copies as the original. That
an article copied from an unpatented article could be made
in some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and
not essential to the use of either article, that the
configuration of the article copied may have a "secondary
meaning" which identifies the maker to the trade, or that
there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant
evidence in applying a State's law requiring such
precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the
copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can
furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the
actual acts of copying and selling.76
By the time it got to Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., however, the Court had moved much closer to the
approach in George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway. The issue in Bonito
Boats was whether patent law preempted a Florida statute that
prohibited use of a direct molding process to duplicate
unpatented boat hulls." And while the Court held that the
statute was indeed preempted and gave lip service to the general
principle that patent protection is an exception to a general rule
of free copying, the Court clearly retreated from its statements in
75. Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964)
(emphasis added). The reference to design patents here is interesting, in light of courts'
general lack of concern about trademark law overlapping with design, as opposed to
utility, patent law. See infra Part III.A.
76. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
77. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1989).
840 [ 48:4
(DYS)FUNCTIONALITY
Sears and Compco that states could not prevent copying of
unpatented features themselves." First, the Court ignored the
precise distinction it had drawn in Sears and Compco between
restrictions on copying, on the one hand, and labeling
requirements on the other. It said:
The Sears Court made it plain that the States "may protect
businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive
dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to
the source of the goods." Trade dress is, of course, potentially
the subject matter of design patents. Yet our decision
in Sears clearly indicates that the States may place limited
regulations on the circumstances in which such designs are
used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.
Thus, while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion
that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade
dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation
of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter is not
ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws."
Sears, of course, specifically concluded that states could not
place conditions on the use of the trade dress itself, even if
confusion resulted; states could instead only require labeling to
ameliorate the consequences of allowing copying."o But this was
not the Court's only reinterpretation of Sears and Compco: it
went on to contrast the Florida statute with state unfair
competition laws, claiming that the latter were legitimate
because:
With some notable exceptions, including the
interpretation of the Illinois law of unfair competition at
issue in Sears and Compco, the common-law tort of unfair
competition has been limited to protection against copying
78. Id. at 165, 167 (holding that "[tihe Florida law substantially restricts the
public's ability to exploit an unpatented design in general circulation, raising the specter
of state-created monopolies in a host of useful shapes and processes for which patent
protection has been denied or is otherwise unobtainable," but suggesting that "the fact
that a particular item lies within the subject matter of the federal patent laws [does not]
necessarily preclude the States from offering limited protection [that] does not
impermissibly interfere with the federal patent scheme").
79. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
80. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964). Later courts
have seized upon this distortion of Sears and Compco to dismiss claims that patent law
preempts trademark protection for product features. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d
632, 641 (7th Cir. 1993) ("As in Sears .. . the Bonito Boats Court recognized that states
have the power to give unfair competition and trademark protection to trade dress."); id.
at 643 (rejecting Kohler's argument that "courts should refuse [protection for product
configurations] and require manufacturers to label their products to prevent consumer
confusion"-precisely the balance Sears and Compco struck).
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of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have
acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a
designation of source. The "protection" granted a particular
design under the law of unfair competition is thus limited
to one context where consumer confusion is likely to result;
the design "idea" itself may be freely exploited in all other
contexts."'
The contrast with Compco in particular could hardly be more
striking. In Compco, the Court expressly said that secondary
meaning and nonfunctionality, and even the possibility of
confusion, "may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law
requiring such precautions as labeling," but they were no basis
"for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying
and selling."82 Bonito Boats pretends Sears and Compco had
never drawn this distinction and claims that those cases stand
for a principle that the Court specifically rejected.
Taking Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats together, it is clear
that even the Supreme Court has oscillated between a strong
"right to copy" view, in which patent law preempts state unfair
competition law with respect to product design features and
leaves states free only to require labeling, and a weaker "need to
copy" view, under which trade dress protection is unproblematic
as long as the claimed features indicate source and are
nonfunctional." Post-TrafFix, the Court seems to have moved
back toward the "right to copy" end of the spectrum." But
TrafFix is still less a "right to copy" case than Sears and Compco
were: TrafFix holds that functional features are not protectable,
and its definition of functionality is animated by structural
concerns, but Sears and Compco refused protection to product
design features altogether, even with respect to nonfunctional
81. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157-58 (citations omitted).
82. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
83. Compare Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33 ("[A] State may, in appropriate
circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled .... But
because of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and
uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself.. . ."), and Compco, 376 U.S. at
238 (noting that while certain factors "may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law
requiring such precautions as labeling," such factors "can[not] furnish a basis for
imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling"), with Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 157-58 ("With some notable exceptions, including the interpretation of
the Illinois law of unfair competition at issue in Sears and Compco . . . the common-law
tort of unfair competition has been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional
aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that they
operate as a designation of source.").
84. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001)
(emphasizing the "heavy burden" that plaintiffs must carry in overcoming the
presumption of functionality when seeking trade dress protection).
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product features." Whereas TrafFix contemplates full trade dress
protection (including injunctions against copying) for
nonfunctional features, Sears and Compco contemplated free
copying subject only to appropriate labeling.86
III. AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
A. Design Patents and the Competitive Landscape
If courts have long struggled to determine the extent to
which utility patent law sets the competitive baseline for
utilitarian features, they have rarely struggled with the role of
design patent law in setting the competitive baseline for
aesthetic or ornamental features.
With a few notable exceptions, courts generally have not
seen any conflict between trademark and design patent law, even
when both apply to the same features. In Kohler Co. v. Moen,
Inc.," for example, the court held that trade dress protection for
product configuration was not preempted by utility patent law so
long as courts required evidence of distinctiveness and
nonfunctionality," and it was not preempted by design patent
law because the contours of trademark law, and particularly its
requirements of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion,
differ from those of design patent law." Trademark law's
requirements, according to the majority, ensured that it was not
anticompetitive:
[T]rademark protection for a product's configuration does not
create a monopoly in the use of the product's shape. Moen
[was] not "free from effective competition in the market for a
popular brand of faucet [on account of trade dress
protection] .... Kohler [was] free to copy Moen's design so
long as it insure[d] that the public [was] not thereby deceived
85. Id. at 29-30; see Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade
Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
79, 144 (2004) ("Sears/ Compco/Bonito Boats asserted a need for access to unpatented
product features across the board, as a general rule, in order for the patent system to
work as intended and to accomplish its enumerated purposes and an overall fostering of
competition.").
86. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28-29; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
87. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 1993).
88. This specific holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's later decisions, and
particularly Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., which accepts that nonfunctional product
design trade dress can be protectable with evidence of secondary meaning. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215-16 (2000).
89. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 638 ("In sum, courts have consistently held that a
product's different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more
than one of the statutory means for protection of intellectual property.").
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or confused into believing that its copy [was] a Moen
faucet.90
Courts generally have accepted this kind of conclusion
without much examination," even though the claims are highly
problematic on their face. First, the court's assertion that "Kohler
[was] free to copy Moen's design" was remarkably disingenuous,
for the effect of trade dress protection was to deny Kohler the
ability to copy Moen's design for the purpose of competing with
Moen in the market for faucets-in other words, in the context
most likely to have economic significance.92 That Kohler was free
to copy the design of Moen's faucet as a sculpture hardly establishes
that trade dress rights work no competitive harm. To the contrary,
the question of competitive harm would seem self-evidently one
primarily about the effects of protection on direct competitors.
Second, precisely because Moen sought protection for the
design of the faucet itself-rather than the name attached to the
faucet or its packaging-the promise that Kohler was free to copy
Moen's design "so long as it insure[d] that the public [was] not
thereby deceived" was an empty one." The whole point of seeking
90. Id. at 640 n.10.
91. See Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pac. Bay Int'l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The
existence of design patent does not preclude the same product from protection as a
trademark under the Lanham Act either simultaneously or successively."); Ferrari S.P.A.
Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1252 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe availability of design
patent protection does not preclude availability of Lanham Act protection."); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ("In our opinion, trademark rights,
or rights under the law of unfair competition, which happen to continue beyond the
expiration of a design patent, do not 'extend' the patent monopoly. They exist
independently of it, under different law and for different reasons. The termination of
either has no legal effect on the continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends,
it ends. The trademark rights do not extend it. We know of no provision of patent law,
statutory or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the subject
matter of any expired patent."); Sunbeam Prods. Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545, 1550 (S.D. Miss. 1996) ("Design patents and trade dress may co-exist whereas
utility patents and trade dress are generally considered to be mutually exclusive."), affd, 123
F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v.
Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002); Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1412, 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The United States Patent and Trademark
Office, as well as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, agree specifically that the
existence of an expired design patent does not preclude trademark rights, or registration
of a trademark."); Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("[T~he expiration of the design patent does not preclude a party from seeking to
protect its reputation or avoid consumer confusion over products if it can demonstrate the
required elements of a Lanham Act, or other non-conflicting unfair competition, claim.").
92. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n. 10; see also id. at 638-42 (discussing Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152, 154 (1989) and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774-75 (1992) and noting extension of trade dress protections
beyond trademark protections).
93. Id. at 640 n.10.
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trade dress protection for product features is to enforce those
rights against others who copy the product features specifically,
even when they do not copy word marks or packaging. Moen was
not asking the court simply to require Kohler to label its faucets
effectively (Kohler had already done that); it was asking the
court to prevent Kohler from copying the faucet's design features
because it contended that it was precisely Kohler's use of the
same design features for its faucets that was likely to create the
confusion." If Moen was right about that-if the confusion was
caused by use of the design features themselves-then it was
impossible for Kohler to use the design in a way that would
ensure the public was not deceived.
The Seventh Circuit's reluctance to see any conflict between
trademark and design patent law was also odd, as Judge Cudahy
made clear in his dissent, because "there is no basis for treating
the subject matter of design and utility patents differently."'
Indeed, "[d]esign and utility patents are created by the same law"
and "[t]here is nothing in the patent law itself that would allow a
distinction to be made between design and utility patents for
purposes of extending trademark protection to one but not to the
other."" This may explain why the Supreme Court made no
distinction between utility and design patent law in Compco:
Day-Brite's fixture has been held not to be entitled to a
design or mechanical patent. Under the federal patent laws
it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied in
every detail by whoever pleases. ... [Ihf the design is not
entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory
protection, then it can be copied at will.97
The extent to which the SearslCompco line of cases applies
to federal trade dress protection is somewhat unclear because
those cases involve federal preemption of state unfair
competition law and there is obviously no preemption issue
where the plaintiff claims federal trademark protection." Some
94. See id. at 633 (recounting the evidence Moen introduced demonstrating the
likelihood of source confusion).
95. Id. at 648 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
98. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing the preemption-based reasoning
behind Sears and Corpco). Kohler, however, grossly overstated the differences between
federal and state trademark law in order to avoid having to deal with the policy
implications of the preemption cases. See, e.g., id. at 640 n.10 (claiming that the "Lanham
Act was drafted in reaction to draconian state trademark legislation that threatened to
interfere with interstate commerce" and that "[tihe Lanham Act differs in many respects
from the common law standards").
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courts and commentators, therefore, read Compco's reference to
"other federal statutory protection" to suggest that the case has
little to say about Lanham Act cases." But whatever the
differences between federal and state trademark law, the
important point here is that the policy issues implicated by
overlapping trademark and patent protection do not depend on
the source of trademark protection.'00 There is, therefore, no
legitimate explanation for courts' categorical refusal to consider
the possibility that the right to copy is equally implicated where
trademark law protects features that would be the subject of
design patent law.
What is no doubt preventing courts from recognizing any
right to copy aesthetic features is the near uniform sense that
aesthetic features generally are not competitively necessary.0 ' In
this respect, Professor McCarthy's view is typical: "[Tihe range of
possible aesthetic designs and configurations is as infinite as are
the tastes that desire them, [so] according trademark protection
to aesthetic features would not greatly hinder competition."' 02 But
while it is true that the number of possible designs for any given
product is very large, that fact is barely relevant to the
question of whether exclusive use of aesthetic features would
hinder competition. The effect on competition is not a function
of the range of designs that are physically or conceptually
possible; it is instead determined by the number of alternative
99. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 ("But if the design is not entitled to a design patent or
other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will."); see also Kohler, 12 F.3d
at 640 (noting "no Lanham Act issue was raised in either Sears or Compco" and "the
Court in Compco noted that a defendant may copy at will if the design is 'not entitled to a
patent or other federal statutory protection'" (quoting Compco, 376 U.S. at 238)); John B.
Pegram, Trademark Protection of Product and Container Configurations, 81 TRADEMARK
REP. 1, 7-8 (1991) ("It appeared that Sears and Compco precluded protection of product
configurations under any unfair competition law.").
100. Here it is important that, in addition to the patents on the machine that
produced shredded wheat biscuits, National Biscuit had obtained a design patent on the
shape of those biscuits, which was invalidated prior to the lawsuit. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-20, 119 n.4 (1938).
101. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 643-44 (majority opinion) (rejecting the argument that
trademark protections for product configurations are anticompetitive and noting that
such protection benefits consumers and encourages creative marketing).
102. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 7:81, at 7-256 (4th ed. 2010) (quoting Deborah J. Krieger, Note, The Broad Sweep of
Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features,
51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 380 (1982)); see also Kohler, 12 F.3d at 648 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) ("The argument for distinguishing between the subjects of design and utility
patents is that, although freedom to copy functional features may be essential to
competition, freedom to copy aesthetic features is not essential." (citing W.T. Rogers Co. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that trademark protection for
"[o]rnamental, fanciful shapes and patterns" does not hinder competition))).
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designs that would be accepted by consumers as reasonable
substitutes.
Whether and how frequently restricting access to aesthetic
features is likely to inflict competitive harm are ultimately
empirical questions, even if those who draw firm conclusions
draw on no actual empirical evidence. We do, however, have good
reason to think aesthetic features are competitively important in
some cases. Indeed, that is the premise of the design patent
system itself: if it were generally true that competitors are at no
disadvantage when they are denied access to aesthetic or
ornamental features, then design patents would have little value.
That we have a design patent system, and that the system is
actually used by designers for the purpose of excluding others
from using ornamental design features, suggests that those
features sometimes are competitively significant. Indeed it seems
so obviously true that ornamental design can be competitively
important that the assertion to the contrary can only be seen as a
normative claim that competitors should not be able to copy
aesthetic features masquerading as an empirical claim about the
need to do so.
Whatever one thinks about that normative claim,
widespread acceptance of the view that aesthetic features are not
competitively important might explain why, even though courts
frequently suggest that copyright stands in the same relation to
competition as patent law-specifically referring to copyright and
patent as the sole exceptions to the right to copy and drawing no
distinction between them'0 -and notwithstanding Dastar,o' no
one seems seriously to suggest that overlap between trademark
and copyright law generally disqualifies copyrightable works
from trademark protection.10 ' And as a matter of fact, a wide
103. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("In
general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an
item, it will be subject to copying."); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 153 (1989) ("The injunction against copying of an unpatented article, freely
available to the public, impermissibly 'interfere [d] with the federal policy, found in Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain."' (quoting Compco, 376 U.S. at 237)).
104. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31-32, 37
(2003) (holding that the Lanham Act's "false designation of origin" language refers only to
the origin of physical goods and not the author of creative material). Notably, Dastar
expressly contemplates that copyrighted or copyrightable works could be the subject of
trademark protection when the works are used to indicate the source of physical goods.
Id. at 37.
105. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1499 (2004)
(discussing availability of overlapping intellectual property protections, including dual
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variety of indicators protected by trademark law-logos,
advertising slogans, advertisements, even product packaging
elements-are copyrightable subject matter.06
Some courts, of course, have softened the view that aesthetic
features are not competitively necessary by developing an aesthetic
functionality doctrine, which I discuss below. But it is worth noting
that the above-quoted passage from Professor McCarthy's treatise
comes from a section in which he argues that aesthetic functionality
is an unnecessary and ill-advised doctrine. And as we will see, even
those courts that have accepted the existence of an aesthetic
functionality doctrine have been more reluctant to find features
aesthetically functional than mechanically functional. It is also
important to note that every court that recognizes aesthetic
functionality views that doctrine solely through the lens of
competitive need. There is no notion in aesthetic functionality cases
that the doctrine aims to police the boundary between trademark
and design patent or copyright law. The "right to copy" view that
animates TrafFix has no analogue in aesthetic functionality.
B. Aesthetic Features and Competitive Need
As the previous sections demonstrated, courts have oscillated
over time between two competing visions of functionality in the
context of utilitarian product features-one that sees functionality
in structural terms, as a doctrine intended to channel protection for
certain features to the patent system, and another that sees
functionality as a safeguard against competitive injury. But courts'
disagreements here have been focused on the policy justifications of
the functionality doctrine in that context; no court has seriously
disputed the importance of functionality in some configuration.
Aesthetic functionality, by contrast, is deeply disputed even at the
highest level of generality despite the Supreme Court's apparent
recognition of the concept in TrafFix0o
Some courts have little trouble with the doctrine and have
applied it to refuse protection to features like the color green for
farm equipment, 8 the color black for outboard motors,' 9 and the
trademark and copyright protection); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 6:17-19 (noting
requirements for dual trademark and copyright protection).
106. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 6:17-19 (noting the availability of both
trademark and copyright protection for advertisements, pictures, logos, and slogans).
107. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33 (noting that it is appropriate for courts to
consider alternative designs in cases of aesthetic functionality).
108. Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 89, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd,
721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
109. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530-33 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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size, shape, and coloring of flash-frozen ice cream beads."o Other
courts seem to accept that the doctrine exists, but because of
their skepticism they are reluctant actually to declare any
features aesthetically functional."' The Ninth Circuit takes a
112
different position on the doctrine nearly every time it comes up.
110. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1206-07
(11th Cir. 2004).
111. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246-47 (6th Cir.
1991) ("[Tlhe precedent in this circuit suggests that aesthetic functionality will not
preclude a finding of nonfunctionality where the design also indicates source."); WSM,
Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1983) ("TS'[s] assertion that its use
of the involved design is 'functional,' i.e., 'ornamental' or 'decorative,' is unavailing. A
purely functional item will not qualify for trademark protection. That an item serves or
performs a function does not mean, however, that it may not at the same time be capable
of indicating sponsorship or origin where aspects of the item are nonfunctional." (citation
omitted)); Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 687
n.15 (W.D. Ky. 2010) ("Because the doctrine is not applicable, the Court declines to
address the validity of the 'aesthetic functionality' doctrine in this Circuit."); Devan
Designs, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 2002 (M.D.N.C.
1992) ("The Fourth Circuit has not considered extending the functionality defense to
aesthetic characteristics. Other circuits remain divided on whether and to what extent to
consider aesthetical features as functional; however, even the Ninth Circuit which first
initiated the concept in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. has retreated from a broad
acceptance of the doctrine.. . . Consequently, this court has no reason to think that the
Fourth Circuit would be inclined to adopt such a policy." (citations omitted)), affd, 998
F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993).
112. Indeed, in its most recent confrontation with aesthetic functionality, the Ninth
Circuit first found that exclusive use of a depiction of the Betty Boop character would put
t-shirt sellers at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage, and the image was
therefore aesthetically functional. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d
1115, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2011). But the court then withdrew its opinion after denying the
plaintiffs motion for rehearing en banc, substituting a new opinion that does not address
functionality at all. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 967-68 (9th
Cir. 2011). This schizophrenia is chronic in the Ninth Circuit. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc.
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that
consumers of keychains desire certain logos for non-source reasons but nevertheless
refusing to find VW and Audi logos aesthetically functional when used to adorn
keychains); Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 2001)
(claiming that the Ninth Circuit had not "adopted the 'aesthetic functionality' theory, that is,
the notion that a purely aesthetic feature can be functional"); First Brands Corp. v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In this circuit, the 'aesthetic'
functionality test has been limited, if not rejected, in favor of the 'utilitarian' functionality
test." (citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Intl Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
918 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that, although the name "Job's Daughters" and the Job's
Daughters insignia were indisputably trademarks when used to identify the organization,
and members of Job's Daughters wore the jewelry to identify themselves as members, the
name and emblem were functional aesthetic components of the defendant's jewelry, "in that
they [were] being merchandised on the basis of their intrinsic value, not as a designation of
origin or sponsorship"); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)
(finding plaintiffs china patterns functional because the patterns were an "important
ingredient in the commercial success" of the china, and not "mere arbitrary embellishment, a
form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individuality
and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the product").
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And despite the Supreme Court's implicit endorsement of the
doctrine,"' some courts maintain that there is no such thing as
aesthetic functionality.114
In his influential treatise, Professor McCarthy argues that
aesthetic functionality is an "inappropriate response to a valid
concern.""' Specifically, McCarthy suggests that the concept is
illogical because "ornamental aesthetic designs are the antithesis
of utilitarian designs," and 'aesthetic functionality' is [therefore]
an oxymoron."" 6 McCarthy's position seems animated by his
reaction to the Pagliero decision, and particularly its definition of
aesthetically functional features as "important ingredient[s] in
the commercial success of the product."'. Thus, he quotes
approvingly the Fifth Circuit's criticism of the Pagliero approach
in Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd.:
The logical extension of this argument would practically
obliterate trademark protection for product design because
a defendant could always argue that its innovative product
is a widget that provides a replica of the most popular or
most prestigious widget on the market, thus requiring that
113. Recall that the Supreme Court in TrafFix rejected the Sixth Circuit's
competitive-necessity test as a comprehensive approach to functionality. TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001). The Court held that features are
functional when they are essential to the use or purpose of an article or affect the cost or
quality of the article, and that once a feature is deemed functional under that "traditional"
definition, non-reputation-related disadvantage need not be considered. Id. But, the Court
continued, "[ilt is proper to inquire into a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage in
cases of [alesthetic functionality, the question involved in Qualitex." Id. at 33 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, in order to explain why Qualitex expanded on the
traditional definition of functionality and referred to a "significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage," the language on which the Sixth Circuit improperly seized to develop its
competitive-necessity test, the Court differentiated between two types of functionality and
suggested that it was the latter, aesthetic functionality type of case in which competitive need
was particularly relevant. Id. at 32-33.
114. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Our circuit has consistently rejected the concept of
aesthetic functionality."); see also id. at 487-88 ("We do not believe that the Court's
dictum in TrafFix requires us to abandon our long-settled view rejecting recognition of
aesthetic functionality."). Others are more equivocal. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d
1042, 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J., concurring) ("[It is arguable that there is no
'doctrine' of aesthetic functionality which stands alone, without consideration of the more
traditional source identification principles of trademark law. To the extent that there may
be-at least with respect to ex parte prosecution practice-it has been previously rejected
by this court.").
115. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:81, at 7-256 to -257.
116. Id. Courts have expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at
1260 ("mrade dress cannot be both 'functional and purely aesthetic.' Such a formulation is
internally inconsistent and at odds with the commonly accepted view that functionality
denotes utility."); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Landroll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that the merger of the utilitarian and the aesthetic is "mischeviously vague").
117. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:79, at 7-240 (quoting Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343).
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the defendant be allowed without further analysis to copy
the plaintiffs widget.'
But if McCarthy's view is indeed a reaction to Pagliero, it is
important that no court continues to follow that case's
approach."' Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized the problems
with the Pagliero test, and particularly its failure to distinguish
between cases in which a feature is an important ingredient in
commercial success of a product because of that feature's salience
as a source indicator, and those in which the feature serves non-
120source-related functions that are important to consumers.
Courts that apply the aesthetic functionality doctrine today
overwhelmingly rely on the test the Supreme Court endorsed in
TrafFix, which draws precisely this distinction, asking whether
exclusive use of the claimed feature put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.12 '
Moreover, if Pagliero was too broad in its exclusion of
features from trademark protection, McCarthy is too sanguine
about the capacity of other doctrines to fill the gap aesthetic
functionality attempts to address. First, McCarthy suggests that
trademark law could prevent one party from acquiring exclusive
rights to particular designs-say, a heart-shaped candy box-by
treating those designs as "merely ornamental," or by recognizing
that many such designs lack secondary meaning.'2 2 But while he
is surely right that courts sometimes use aesthetic functionality
in place of an intuition that the claimed features do not, in fact,
indicate source,"' he assumes far too easily that the available
118. Id. § 7:81, at 7-259 (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526,
539 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Tra/Fix, 532 U.S. 23).
119. See id. (noting that the argument presented in Pagliero would substantively
eviscerate trademark protection for product design).
120. See Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[Tihis court has specifically limited application of the Pagliero functionality test to
product features and has refused to apply the test to cases involving trade dress and
packaging."); Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981)
("We disagree with the district court insofar as it found that any feature of a product
which contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter of
law, a functional element of that product. Neither Pagliero nor the cases since decided in
accordance with it impel such a conclusion.").
121. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
122. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:81, at 7-256 to -258 ("[Tlrademark law has
long had a rule to deal with that situation: the 'merely ornamental' rule... . Do customers
perceive this feature as mere attractive ornamentation or also as a symbol that identifies
and distinguishes a single source?").
123. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 82
(2d Cir. 1990) ("Of course, if Wallace were able to show secondary meaning in a precise
expression of baroque style, competitors might be excluded from using an identical or
virtually identical design."), abrogated on other grounds by Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs
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tools for measuring secondary meaning will reliably demonstrate
as much.'2 4 More importantly, there are plenty of examples of
features that might actually have secondary meaning, but which
nevertheless are competitively necessary in at least some
context-for example, school colors 25 or the insignia of a fraternal
organization. 26
Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). Pagliero itself seems to put functionality and source
indication in opposition to each other. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,
343 (9th Cir. 1952) ("[W]here the features are 'functional' there is normally no right to
relief. 'Functional' in this sense might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose.
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product,
the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. On
the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a
form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individuality
and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the product, imitation
may be forbidden .... Under such circumstances, since effective competition may be
undertaken without imitation, the law grants protection." (footnotes omitted)).
124. In a few cases, courts have expressed skepticism that the same kinds of
circumstantial evidence courts rely on to determine secondary meaning in word mark
cases will accurately reflect secondary meaning in trade dress cases. See, e.g., Duraco
Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452-53 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Sales success by
itself will typically not be as probative of secondary meaning in a product configuration
case as in a trademark case, since the product's market success may well be attributable
to the desirability of the product configuration rather than the source-designating
capacity of the supposedly distinguishing feature or combination of features. And unlike
with a trademark, where repeated purchases of a product support an inference that
consumers have associated the mark with the producer or source, one can much less
confidently presume that a consumefs repeated purchase of a product has created an
association between a particular product configuration and the source."); Int'l Jensen, Inc.
v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1993) ("While evidence of a
manufacturer's sales, advertising and promotional activities may be relevant in
determining secondary meaning, the true test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of
this effort to create it."). But that skepticism is hardly universal; courts frequently rely
heavily on circumstantial evidence of sales and advertising even in product configuration
cases. See, e.g., Cartier, Inc. v. Sardell Jewelry, Inc., 294 F. App'x 615, 618 (2d Cir. 2008)
("It is clear from the documents submitted by Cartier that Cartier spends a significant
amount of money on advertising in general and also specifically for the Tank Francaise. It
was not clearly erroneous for the district court to have concluded that this factor weighed
in favor of finding that the Tank Francaise had acquired a secondary meaning."); Tone
Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[W]e hold that, in relying on the
Gelb study, in addition to other circumstantial evidence on the issue of secondary meaning
(e.g., advertising, the amount of spices sold in Tone's container, and intentional copying), Tone
has raised a genuine issue of material fact-whether there is an association in the mind of the
consumer between the container's shape and appearance and an indication of source for the
spices contained therein, as a separate indication from that of the private labels.").
125. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Smack argues that the Universities' colors do
perform functions unrelated to trademark because the Universities use the colors in
activities and programs in connection with student life, buildings, and other programs
and events and that the colors are not used solely to identify the Universities as a source
of goods. However, the claimed trademarks are in the color schemes and other indicia of
the Universities when dombined on merchandise that refer to the Universities.").
126. Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir.
1980) ("[Tlhe name 'Job's Daughters' and the Job's Daughters insignia are indisputably
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McCarthy dodges cases like these by claiming that courts
could just treat the need for such features, or for a heart shape
for candy boxes, under the traditional utilitarian functionality
rule because those features might be "just as 'utilitarian' from a
marketing viewpoint as any engineering analysis of rectangular
versus circular box sizes and shipping stability and cost of
manufacture."127 But if he really believes this, then his objection
to aesthetic functionality is purely semantic, for the point of
aesthetic functionality is to capture cases in which the need for a
feature is dictated by market expectations rather than
engineering problems. Farm equipment does not work better
because it is green-it does not till better, work longer, or cut more
reliably-just as strawberry-flavored flash-frozen ice cream does not
taste better because it is pink."' If, however, consumers expect their
used to identify the organization, and members of Job's Daughters wear the jewelry to
identify themselves as members. In that context, the insignia are trademarks of Job's
Daughters. But in the context of this case, the name and emblem are functional aesthetic
components of the jewelry, in that they are being merchandised on the basis of their
intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.").
127. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:81, at 7-258.
128. In fact, strawberry ice cream probably does taste better because it is pink, as
color has been shown to influence subjective taste assessments. See, e.g., Carol M.
Christensen, Effects of Color on Aroma, Flavor and Texture Judgments of Foods, 48 J.
FOOD Sci. 787, 789-90 (1983) (finding that appropriately colored foods were perceived to
have stronger and better quality aroma); Cynthia N. DuBose, Armand V. Cardello
& Owen Maller, Effects of Colorants and Flavorants on Identification, Perceived Flavor
Intensity, and Hedonic Quality of Fruit-Flavored Beverages and Cake, 45 J. FOOD SCI.
1393, 1395 (1980) (finding that color masking had an adverse effect on flavor
identification and that color level had a significant effect on reported flavor intensity with
respect to beverages and cakes); J. Johnson & F.M. Clydesdale, Perceived Sweetness and
Redness in Colored Sucrose Solutions, 47 J. FOOD Sci. 747, 749-52 (1982) (finding that
intensity of red color in cherry-flavored beverages affected sweetness estimates, with
darker-colored beverages being perceived as sweeter); Nicholas raim et al., The Influence
of Flavor and Color on Drink Identification by Children and Adults, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 239, 240-45 (1995) (reporting findings suggesting that, from a young
age, children know how to use color or flavor to identify drinks and that identification
becomes less influenced by color as children age to adulthood); D.H. Philipsen et al.,
Consumer Age Affects Response to Sensory Characteristics of a Cherry Flavored Beverage,
60 J. FOOD Sci. 364, 364-68 (1995) (finding that increasing red coloring for an artificially
flavored beverage resulted in increase in reported flavor quality and overall acceptability,
and that the number of respondents correctly identifying the flavor as cherry decreased as
the color changed from red to orange to yellow); H.A. Roth et al., Psychophysical
Relationships Between Perceived Sweetness and Color in Lemon- and Lime-Flavored
Drinks, 53 J. FOOD SCI. 1116, 1118-19 (1988) (finding color affected perception of
sweetness at consistent sucrose concentrations); Jennifer A. Stillman, Color Influences
Flavor Identification in Fruit-Flavored Beverages, 58 J. FOOD SCI., 810, 810-12 (1993)
(finding that correct identification of artificially flavored orange and raspberry drinks
decreased when the beverages were uncolored). But see Carol M. Christensen, Effect of
Color on Judgments of Food Aroma and Flavour Intensity in Young and Elderly Adults,
14 PERCEPTION 755, 761-62 (1985) (finding that food color did not alter the perception of
aroma and flavor strength). This specific point is important because it suggests that
defendants in food coloration cases should press a utilitarian functionality argument in
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farm equipment to be green or their strawberry-flavored ice cream
to be pink, then those colors serve non-source-related functions,
and they do so even if consumers also associate the colors with
John Deere and Dippin' Dots, respectively. Whether courts want
to talk about that function by calling the features aesthetically
functional or "utilitarian from a marketing viewpoint" is just a
semantic question. Regardless of the terminology, it is important to
recognize that features can serve at least two different types of
functions-they may play a role in the product's utilitarian
performance, making it work better for its intended use, or they
may play a role in meeting consumer expectations. It makes
sense to differentiate these types of functionality because they
interact with patent law in different ways: features related to
mechanical function implicate a concern about overlap with the
utility patent system, while features needed because of consumer
expectations do not. The latter type of features, however, which
might include color and shape, might well be features subject to
design patent protection.
C. Functional Use and the Duality Problem
One explanation for courts' greater reticence about aesthetic
functionality is that the consequences of a functionality finding
seem too harsh in the context of many aesthetic functionality cases.
In the mechanical or utilitarian functionality setting, functionality
goes to the existence of the plaintiffs rights in the claimed features.
Hence, if a court finds the claimed features functional, it has
declared those features unprotectable-free for all to use.129 This is a
significant consequence because it extends beyond the parties and
prevents the claimant from asserting rights in the features against
anyone."o But because mechanical functionality cases nearly always
involve defendants that are direct competitors of the trade dress
claimant, there is rarely reason to be overly concerned about the
breadth of a functionality finding; defendants in mechanical
functionality cases want access to the claimed features for the same
reason the plaintiff does. Cases of aesthetic functionality, however,
place of, or at least in addition to, aesthetic functionality. I use this example as one of
aesthetic functionality simply because that is the way the court in Dippin' Dots
understood the need for the color pink. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution,
LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203-06 (11th Cir. 2004). More generally, these studies suggest that
the line between aesthetic and utilitarian functionality can be quite fine-perhaps even
metaphysical. I thank Rebecca Tushnet for bringing these studies to my attention.
129. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001) (noting
that, if a feature is functional, "secondary meaning is irrelevant because there can be no
trade dress protection in any event").
130. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:63-64, at 7-175 to -181.
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sometimes deviate from this pattern because they involve
defendants who want to use the feature at issue for a purpose that
differs from the claimant's primary interest in the feature. This
brings into high relief a point McCarthy glosses over-aesthetic
functionality cases frequently involve features that have both
source-related and non-source-related significance, so that one
cannot easily say that the feature is either functional, on the one
hand, or has source significance, on the other.'
This problem of dual significance appears even in standard
cases involving competing goods like Dippin' Dots, where the
shape and color of flash-frozen ice cream beads might both be
associated with a particular source and be competitively
necessary."' But the problem is particularly acute where the
defendant's use is in a different context than the plaintiffs core
use because it is there that courts are most aware that the
ordinary consequence of a functionality finding is to render the
feature unprotectable in all cases."' In Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., for example, the defendant wanted
to use the Volkswagen logo on key chains and license plate
covers, which it plausibly contended consumers wanted so that
their accessories would match their cars.'34 In what might
ordinarily be regarded as an admission that logos serve non-source
functions in some contexts, the court acknowledged that
"[clonsumers sometimes buy products bearing marks such as the
Nike Swoosh, the Playboy bunny ears, the Mercedes tri-point
131. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2008). McCarthy suggests that many of the aesthetic functionality
cases could be dealt with by declaring the features at issue "merely ornamental." See 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:81, at 7-256 to -259. And where features have the kind of
dual significance I noted above, McCarthy would always err on the side of protecting
source indication: "What neither consumers nor the law of trademark needs is a new
'public policy' denying trademark and trade dress protection to identifying symbols that
customers perceive and rely on in their purchasing decisions." Id. § 7:81, at 7-259. But
that statement merely reflects a value judgment that confusion takes precedence over
other values.
132. Dippin' Dots, 369 F.3d at 1200-03 (addressing Dippin' Dots's allegation of trade
dress infringement on its unique, flash-frozen ice-cream by its competitor, Frosty Bites,
and concluding that Dippin' Dots failed to establish the nonfunctionality of its product
design).
133. This consequence is not quite universal, even if it is the result in the
overwhelming number of cases. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d
531, 545-46 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("[The functionality doctrine protects Google's use of the
Rosetta Stone Marks as keyword triggers."). Dan Burk endorses this approach to
functionality as a contextual defense where trademarks are used as "components of a data
processing system, intended to initiate and control discrete functions of a machine." Dan
L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2010).
134. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos, for
the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies
the origin or sponsorship of the product.""' Nevertheless, the
court could not bring itself to find that the logos were
functional because it insisted that "aesthetic functionality has
been limited to product features that serve an aesthetic
purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying
function.""' So understood, aesthetic functionality is merely
the opposite of source indication, and it is inapplicable where a
defendant makes use of a feature that obviously signifies
source when used in certain contexts. According to the court,
"the alleged aesthetic function [of the VW logos was]
indistinguishable from and tied to the mark's source-identifying
nature."13 7
This statement from the Ninth Circuit reflects a
misunderstanding of the nature of the source indication that is
necessary for a trademark claim. It may be that VW logos are
inescapably recognized as VW logos however they are used, but
that does not mean that consumers regard them, when used to
adorn key chains and license plate covers, primarily as indicators
of the source of the key chains and license plate covers. The
court's inability to see this distinction was driven by a
combination of its mistaken view that aesthetic functionality is
the opposite of source indication and the misimpression that
differences in use context do not matter to the source indication
question."' But on a more basic level, what prevented the court
from appreciating the differences in context was its sense of what
135. Id. at 1067.
136. Id. at 1073.
137. Id. at 1074.
138. Job's Daughters struggled with a similar question of dual significance, and
while it came down on the side of functionality, that conclusion clearly was influenced by
the court's acceptance of the district court's factual conclusion that confusion was unlikely
in the context of the jewelry sold by the defendant. See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918-20 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Our holding does not mean that a
name or emblem could not serve simultaneously as a functional component of a product
and a trademark. That is, even if the Job's Daughters' name and emblem, when inscribed
on Lindeburg's jewelry, served primarily a functional purpose, it is possible that they
could serve secondarily as trademarks if the typical customer not only purchased the
jewelry for its intrinsic functional use and aesthetic appeal but also inferred from the
insignia that the jewelry was produced, sponsored, or endorsed by Job's Daughters. We
recognize that there is some danger that the consumer may be more likely to infer
endorsement or sponsorship when the consumer is a member of the group whose collective
mark or trademark is being marketed. Accordingly, a court must closely examine the
articles themselves, the defendant's merchandising practices, and any evidence that
consumers have actually inferred a connection between the defendant's product and the
trademark owner." (citations omitted)).
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follows from a functionality finding: functional features do not
enjoy trademark protection-at all.'" So for the Ninth Circuit, a
finding that the VW logos were functional would have compelled
the conclusion that VW owned no rights in the VW logos for any
purposes, including for when used to designate the source of
Volkswagen's vehicles. That conclusion was too much for the
Ninth Circuit to swallow, so it simply rejected the conclusion that
should have followed from its concession that consumers wanted
the accessories for non-source-related reasons. But there is no
reason why functionality must always be so categorical. Courts
could instead sometimes treat the functionality doctrine as an
individualized defense, protecting a particular defendant's ability
to use features for their non-source function without affecting the
plaintiffs rights in those features in other contexts.
Some might suggest that concerns about this kind of duality
could be handled by applying a "trademark use" doctrine-in
Au-Tomotive Gold, for example, by arguing that the defendant
should not be considered infringing because its use of the VW
logo was for non-source-designating purposes.140 And indeed
treating functionality as a defense specific to an individual
defendant rather than as a basis for declaring features
categorically unprotectable would make functionality more like a
trademark use defense.'4 ' But this approach to functionality
differs from trademark use in important ways too. First of all,
functionality is a defense in trademark cases even if the claimed
features designate source, whereas a trademark use defense at
least purports to shield uses of a mark because they do not
indicate source. A more particularized functionality defense (one
focused on the defendant's functional use) should bar a plaintiffs
claim when the defendant's use is functional in nature, but where
"functional in nature" is not the opposite of "designates source."
In other words, a court should be able to find a defendant's use to
be functional even if the features at issue might also indicate to
consumers something about source.
139. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 7:63, at 7-175 to -176.
140. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IowA L. REV. 1669, 1673-74, 1681-84, 1699-700 (2007); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54
EMORY L.J. 461, 471-72 (2005) (arguing that fans do not buy t-shirts with their school, team,
or rock band name for their source designating function, but for the product itself).
141. Indeed, in Pagliero, the Ninth Circuit suggested that functionality "might be
said to connote [use for] other than a trade-mark purpose." Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F,2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
142. Confusion from possible source indication could be remedied through labeling, as
courts operating in the "freedom to copy" tradition routinely recognized. See Mark P. McKenna,
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As I have argued before, any defense that requires a court to
determine that the defendant's use does not indicate source is not
really a defense in a true sense; uses that do not indicate source are
not actionable under the Lanham Act even as a prima facie
matter.143 Courts could avoid this problem in the functionality
context by finding a feature aesthetically functional whenever the
defendant uses a feature primarily for its non-source-related
function, even if that feature also indicates source. In this respect,
the defense I propose is consistent with the aspiration underlying
the Supreme Court's holding in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impressions I, Inc., that "some possibility of consumer
confusion must be compatible with fair use."'44 It differs from
genericness and descriptiveness because both of those defenses
depend on a finding that the claimed mark does not indicate source,
and both therefore lead to the conclusion that the mark is not
protectable at all.' 4'
IV. CONCLUSION
Functionality doctrine is fractured. Courts disagree in
mechanical functionality cases about the purposes of the
Back to the Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion in Trademark Cases, 14 LEwis & CLARK
L. REV. 537, 547-53 (2010) (arguing that courts could use their equitable discretion to order
limited remedies like clear labeling in cases of mixed consumer understanding).
143. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 773, 803-04 (2009).
144. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
121-22 (2004). I say the "aspiration" underlying the holding because, despite the Court's
insistence, lower courts have struggled mightily to figure out how it could be true that some
amount of confusion is compatible with fair use when the statute also requires that a
descriptive fair use be a use "otherwise than as a mark." See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006)
("[Ulse of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than
as a mark,... of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin .. . ."
(emphasis added)). As I described elsewhere, this clause makes consumer understanding
an inexorable determinant of the fair-use defense under current statutory language. See
McKenna, supra note 143, at 773, 802-05 ("[W1hile some amount of confusion may be
compatible with fair use, no amount of actionable confusion is compatible with the
statutory fair use provision.").
145. A generic term is "the name of a particular genus or class of which an individual
article or service is but a member" and such a term "can never attain trademark
protection." See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th
Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Lasting
Impressions, 543 U.S. 111. A descriptive term "identifies a characteristic or quality of an
article or service, such as its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients," and
descriptive terms may become valid marks only when they have acquired a secondary
meaning in the minds of the consuming public. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "[Slecondary meaning [is acquired when] ... in the minds of the public, the
primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself." Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,851 n.11 (1982).
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functionality doctrine, and that disagreement reflects in
fundamentally different doctrinal approaches to determining the
functionality of particular product features. On one side are
courts that view functionality as a structural mechanism for
preserving the distinction between patent and trademark law,
and these courts view the limitations of patent rights as
important markers. Specifically, these courts regard patent
rights as carefully circumscribed exceptions to a general right to
copy the features of another's products. On this view, only patent
law can abrogate the right to copy, and features within the ambit
of patent law cannot be protected by trademark law. Hence, for
these "right to copy" courts, the fact that the features at issue
are, or were, covered by a utility patent is nearly dispositive. On
the other side are courts that view functionality primarily as a
safeguard against competitive harm. There is, for these courts,
no general right to copy; features that are eligible for trademark
protection because they indicate source are excluded from
protection only when there is reason to think that protection is
likely to cause significant injury to particular competitors. Thus,
for "need to copy" courts, the existence of a valid or expired utility
patent may be relevant, but it is not dispositive because patented
features are not always competitively necessary.
These competing views of the policy justifications for the
functionality doctrine reflect different understandings of the
relationship between intellectual property regimes, and of the
relationship between intellectual property rights and competition
policy more generally. And we see similar disagreement about
the relationship of trademark law to competition policy in the
context of aesthetic functionality, even if courts more uniformly
have rejected the notion that the boundaries of design patent
law, or copyright law, reflect policy judgments about what
materials are free for all the world to copy. Specifically, we see in
courts' disagreements about the existence and breadth of the
aesthetic functionality doctrine a disagreement about the extent
to which aesthetic features are competitively necessary. Here,
the skeptics are winning: courts seem persuaded that aesthetic
features generally are not competitively necessary, which reflects
both in some courts rejecting the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality altogether and other courts being reluctant to apply
it even when they recognize the doctrine.
Pulling back from the functionality doctrine specifically,
these conflicting cases reveal deep tension about trademark law's
vision of "fair" competition. Is there a general, background
principle of free copying, to which there are a few exceptions, or
is copying generally illicit? If there is no empirical evidence
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supporting the contention that aesthetic features are
competitively unimportant, then are courts' naked assertions on
this score anything more than veiled claims that one ought not
compete with others by copying aesthetic features (or, put
differently, that parties should compete on design)? This lack of a
fully articulated or defended theory of fair competition, and of
trademark law's role in competition policy, is a serious problem
because trademark law is generally considered to be a species of
the law of unfair competition. Yet we can only judge acts to be
unfair forms of competition if we have in mind a vision of fair
competition against which to judge the accused acts. There is
much work to be done here, absent which we cannot reasonably
expect functionality doctrine to cohere.
